Perhaps the best example of this espoused separation between politics and international competition is the current commercial on ESPN with Bono as the narrator[Insert link to movie]. Pictures of political conflict flash across the screen as Bono explains all the things the World Cup is not about. He says, "It's not about politics,” and the screen goes to the National Mall where a political demonstration is taking place. This pattern continues until the music comes to a crescendo and Bono proclaims, “This is about the one month, every four years, when we all agree on one thing.”, and we see images of celebration within a stadium. He concludes, “32 nations. The whole world watching.” We are supposed to believe the World Cup is tantamount to a political holiday.
This idea is quite reassuring. A break from political chatter would be nice, and international sporting events would have us believe they fulfill this important role. We often forget, however, that the founding principles of these competitions were based on political goals, however noble they were. For example, although Pierre de Coubertin always publicly asserted the Olympics should be apolitical, he also believed the Olympic movement could facilitate international friendship and help in the establishment of world peace - something Bono claims the World Cup is not about[Strenk 138]. This, in itself, constituted a political wish.
In reality, the claim that international competition is free from politics is highly misleading. Host countries subtly use international competition to portray a favorable image to the visiting nations. For example, for the 2010 World Cup, South Africa is trying to show it is a modern country capable of being a major player on the international stage. In preparation for the Cup, they have destroyed shanti-towns and relocated poor people from areas of the city which will be on display during the competition. Clearly, contrary to Bono’s claim, the World Cup is linked to the economic well being of people. Furthermore, China wished to present a compelling national image for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Bejjing. China’s slogan for the games was "One World, One Dream" emphasizing the idea harmony and unity. The Chinese government wished to portray the country as a modern, leviathan nation, unified in purpose.
Sometimes, international competition can even be used to justify the existence of a regime. Unfortunately, this was the case with the 1978 World Cup in Argentina and the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin. As was mentioned before, the Argentine government was panicking as it tried to gloss over the mass murder before and during the Cup. However, in many ways, the World Cup actually helped this oppressive military government remain in power until the events of the Falkland Islands War in 1982. During the World Cup, the government was able to effectively silence protest. At the time, few Argentines knew about the disappearances and killings. Many Argentines began to despise the international outcry, and this, along with Argentina’s eventual victory, actually promoted national unity and further entrenched the oppressive government.
Clearly we have seen that, contrary to what these events would have us believe, international competition is inevitably intertwined with politics. The following anthology is not primarily concerned with legitimizing this claim. We are more fascinating by the continual denial that the international sporting movement is even in the least bit politically infused. We will analyze four historically important international competitions in hopes of finding the answer. Through our research, we have found that theatrics are extensively used in international competition. Most of the time, these theatrics are used to aid in the cover-up the competition's true political nature. Therefore, we will delve extensively into the events preceding the Olympics such as boycotts and opening ceremonies. We will also explore how the depiction of the actual competition helps in this cover-up. We believe that, even as countries use international sport for political goals, they see sports as a way to celebrate and wish for an ideal world without strife and dispute.
Ideologies of the Games: A Close Reading of Avery Brundage and Leni Riefenstahl
Aaron Bauer
The Olympic Games have become a permanent fixture in our global society. Every two years we can look forward to two weeks of intense international competition and, as most would have us believe, international detente. However, quite paradoxically, mostly during the months and weeks following the games, we can look forward to heated political debate. Every time political controversy surfaces, we are forced to ask the question: should the Olympics be subject to current political issues? We may be tempted to conclude that politics have no place in international competition. Many point to the 1936 Berlin Games, better known as the Nazi Olympics, as evidence that the games should not be politicized. However, we forget that many people in the 1930’s against the politicization of the Games held similar justification for participating in the games. Lost in history is the near boycott by the American team. Evidence of extensive persecution of Jews and other minorities was beginning to surface, and many believed America’s participation would only help in legitimizing this persecution. The president of the American Olympic Committee(AOC), Avery Brundage, was the main figure against this boycott. In this paper, I will not evaluate the claim that the 1936 Olympics was a podium for propaganda. Instead, I will examine Avery Brundages actions during the boycott controversy leading up to the 1936 Games. I will also explore how Brundage’s idealistic view of the athlete was, in many ways, visually expressed in Leni Riefenstahl’s documentary of the games Olympia. From these sources, an ideology about the athlete, and the role politics in international competition will begin to emerge, revealing an ideology that is distinctly “Olympic”.
Avery Brundage’s insistence that the U.S. participate in the Berlin games stems from his ideological view of the amateur. By his own admission, the term amateur can be very vague. The word amateur usually has negative connotations. Most see the amateur as one who is inexperienced and sees his/her sport. However, Brundage rejects this definition, “An amateur can be old or young, he can be rich or poor, he can be a beginner or a veteran... as long as he does what he is doing for the pleasure that he obtains from it and not for any material rewards, direct or indirect.”¹ In this notion of the amateur, the skill level of the athlete is irrelevant. The only defining factor is whether or not the participant engages in his/her sport for simple pleasure. Also, by associating amateurism with people of all walks of life, Brundage eliminates class and racial barriers in the world of sports. The societal laws which enforce class restrictions seem to vanish.
Indeed, Brundage seems to construct a wholly separate external reality reserved for the world of sports; a separate separate space. According to Brundage, the athlete is one who keeps his professional and vocational life separate from his sports life: “ Sport is a pastime and a diversion it is play, it is action for amusement, free, spontaneous, joyous, for recreation. The minute sport becomes any more than this, it is a business, it is work, it is not sport. Sport is incidental to the main business of life, and should not be allowed to interfere with the main business of life. It is an avocation and not a vocation. Sport must not be allowed to interfere with the acquisition of an education, or with the pursuit of a trade or profession.”² It may seem ironic that a man so devoted to the advancement of sports in the United States and the success of international competition would call sport a “diversion”. However, this belief represents an ideology about the role of sports in society expressed by many prominent members of the Olympic International Committee(IOC). In fact, Carl Diem, the man in charge of the German Olympic Committee and director of the Berlin games expressed similar views about the role of sports: “...Carl Diem cheerfully and paradoxically believed that pure sport was really for the world’s elite...Diem doubted not that sport could both inspire the most passionate patriotism and soothe aggressive tempers and was therefore a contributer to the harmony of nations.”³ We can imagine why Diem and Brundage would seek isolate the events of the Olympiad and elevate them to a higher position than mere sport.
A close reading of Olympic fanfare reveals an Olympic sacredness. In the opening and closing ceremonies of every olympiad, the olympic flag is raised and lowered by soldiers of the host country to the music of the Olympic anthem - a song created by Strauss during Berlin olympics -. The use of the flag in these ceremonies, in many ways creates a national identity separated from the sovereignty of the other nations. The implication is that a temporary state is created where athletes are free from the monetary and political trappings of the real world and invited to pursue world unity through sport.
Professionalism seems to impeded on this pure, external reality of sports. For Brundage and the IOC, passion for one’s sport and professionalism are mutually exclusive; in the words of Brundage, you cannot have your cake and eat it too. He says, “An athlete is an amateur only so long as he is competing for the love of the sport. The minute that financial, political, or commercial considerations intrude, he is no longer an amateur.”⁴ According to Brundage, professionalism dampers the pure joy that would otherwise be experienced by the amateur athlete. We still have no solid grasp on the exact nature of this “pure joy”. Brundage and most other sports aristocrats would rather have us leave it at that. However, we will later see how this ethereal language about the amateur athlete in juxtaposition to the professional one is based on elements of classism.
We can see how the exclusion of politics from sports seems a natural extension of this ideology, and it is one Avery Brundage held passionately to during the debate preceding the Olympics. The hope that the Olympics would facilitate peace and detente between countries certainly propelled his view that the Olympics should be free of the trappings of politics. In her article entitled Avery Brundage and American Participation in the 1936 Olympic Games, Carolyn Marvin says of Brundage, “ Although the Iron Chancellor of amateur sport regarded himself as the last true defender of the strict separation of sport and politics, he also frequently insisted that more than the future of amateur sport was at stake in shielding sport from political manipulation. Upon sport for sport's sake depended the healthy psychological valuation of individual effort.”⁵
One of the most profound visual manifestations of this ideological rhetoric of the “pure”, amateur athlete can be found in Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia. Olympia cares little for extraneous matters. Perhaps this is why overt Nazi ideology generally takes a diminished role in the film. The film attempts to portray pure athlete. It begins with panoramic shots of Greek ruins. This makes clear Riefenstahl’s intention to link the ancient Olympics with the Berlin games. Indeed we see the ancient statuette of a discuss thrower, mid-throw, meld into the actual German deca-athlete Erwin Huber who begins a long wind up sequence before releasing the discus. Riefenstahl’s connection of the modern and greek world represents a long standing idealization of the ancient Greek competition. We never actually see where the discus lands, and this pattern continues with a series semi nude athletes participating in various slow motion athletic activities. In each sequence we only see the action being performed, never the intended outcome. This constitutes an emphasis on the performance of the task and the movement of the body.
With the nude athletes shown in slow motion and the emphasis on the body, some might be tempted to call this erotic imagery. However, Michael Mckenzie in his article From Athens to Berlin: The 1936 Olympics and Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia, rejects the argument that this portrayal of the athlete is sexually erotic. Instead, he uses the term “eros” to describe Riefenstahl’s depiction. “Eros” describes a more “innocent” love of the body associated with “health” and “vitality”⁶. This emphasis on the body comes at the cost of minimizing the actual competition at hand. Mackenzie says, “Athletes are shown, quite often, abstracted from the context of the contests themselves: we watch one shot- putter after another launch his heavy sphere; we see how each gathers his concentration; we see their graceful turns and lunges in slow motion, but we never see where the shot lands or how far it's gone.”⁷ This appears as a common theme not only in the dramatic introduction, but also in the ensuing depiction of events.
For example in her filming of the diving competition, we see no actual score cards or winners. The most we see are the divers plunging into the water, and then the camera switches to another dive. Eventually, even the divers’ entrances into water fades out and we begin to see a beautiful collage of flips and twirls against the backdrop of the sky. At this point the athlete has become fully separated from his purpose as even the diving board is abolished from our view. Here we see Riefenstahl attempting to impose her pure, “erotic” view of the human figure on the competitor by strictly emphesizing the athleticism of the competitor - although, even the presence of a competition is minimized.
Riefenstahl’s portrayal of the athlete is similar to Brundage’s view because of her insistence on the singularity and beauty of the human form even in the face of the reality of bruising competition. Like Brundage, Riefensthahl wishes to isolate the athlete through her aesthetic ideal of “eros”, and, like Brundage, she ends up creating a separate space for that athlete. The purely eroticized athletes are banned even from the context of the competition. Far from me to assert that Avery Brundage did not believe in athletic competition. However, both Brundage and Riefenstahl make this idealistic construction of the athlete as one who stands alone, and, in many ways, this constitutes a unified world view of the athlete. Both constitute an ideology about the role of the athlete in modern society.
In his spare time, Avery Brundage was a very successful Chicago builder. In spite of Brundages belief that amateurism transcends class barriers, in practice, amateurism only favored the upper classes. Brundage himself was a wealthy man. He played sports in college, competing in the decathelon. After college, Brundage started a successful civil engineering firm and eventually became a prominent real-estate investor. He used his money to advance the Olympic movement in the Chicago and the greater United States. Wealth was a trait shared by all prominent members in the Olympic movement since its inception with Coubertin⁸. Kevin B. Wamsley in his article The Global Sport Monopoly: A Synopsis of 20th Century Olympic Politics, says the early Olympic Movement, “Provided opportunities for participation for middle and upper class men only” and that, “Sport reinforced the social and economic inequalities of the era”⁹. According to Wamsley, the early IOC established itself by aggressively asserting its power and “obliterating” similar international sporting festivals. Far from its public rhetoric of equality, the IOC also initially excluded women from competition, claiming they would be better as spectators¹⁰.
We see here the construction of an ideology. In his essay Ideologies of the Assyrian Kings, Mario Liverani talks about the importance of ideologies not only for the general masses but, more importantly, for the rulers of a society. Ideologies give the ruling class philosophical justifications for their actions, no matter how flawed their logic is. Patrons of the Olympic Movement, including Avery Brundage, constructed the ideal amateur athlete from their lofty socioeconomic standing. In fact, the whole amateur movement was an upper class construction of 19th Century, Victorian Britain. Thus, rather than transcending and ignoring class barriers, early movement for Olympic amateurism actually reinforced these class structures.
Avery Brundage inadvertently admits to the use of sports in upholding these these class structures. In the same essay where Avery Brundage attacks professionalism in sports, he acknowledges the value of sports and “play” in the modern industrial system. He argues that “play” energizes the worker and leads to better efficiency: “play is required for a well-rounded life, as is well known to educators. It is a psychological necessity. It leads to better efficiency in the worker, to a more enjoyable existence.”¹¹ Here we see the amateur athletic system actually helping the capitalistic system. Indeed, Brundage drew comparisons between pure athletic competition and industrial competition. Yet, in the words of Carolyn Marvin, “The ideological component of this escaped him bitterly.”¹² By acknowledging the benefits of amateur athleticism the capitalistic system, he inadvertently breaks his own ideology about the separation of the athlete from industry and professionalism. Brundage might be excused for breaking his ideology in this arena. However, he consciously displayed overt political ideology while he was advocating his “apolitical” ideals during the boycott debate leading up to the Berlin Games.
Brundage ardently opposed communism - a revulsion he happened to share with the Nazi regime -. To Brundage, the success of the Nazi government appeared was preferential to, what he felt, was the growing tide of communism in Europe. He believed America’s participation in the Berlin Games would be a kind of congratulations to the German people¹³.
To this end, he attempted to legitimize the Nazi regime during the boycott debate preceding the Olympics. Anytime an issue arose which Jews or Catholics took issue with, Brundage would always side with the Germans. A common argument made by those in favor of the boycott was that Germans Jews were being barred from participating on the German Olympic team. Brundage’s response was simply that this was Jewish self-aggrandizement and that there were few German athletes of “Olympic caliber” in the first place¹⁴. This is in spite of the fact that many German Jews actually had actually gained prominence in athletics. For example, Margaret Lambert managed to equal the German Women’s high jump record at trials. Nevertheless, on the eve of the games she received a letter from the German Olympic Committee stating that her jump was not good enough for her to compete on the German team.
Leni Riefenstahl, whether subconsciously or not, also breaks with her ideology. Scholars still debate over her intentions. Some assert that Olympia is covertly fascist. The film’s emphasis on the lone human body in athletic poses can be linked to elements of fascism. In Olympia’s introduction we see athletes engaging in various physically strenuous activities. However, we never see the pain of physical exertion on the actors’ faces. In fact, they appear calm and collected. Likewise, Riefenstahl never depicts the inevitable pain athletes suffer from their exertion; the tired runner at the end of a race or the nauseous weight lifter after a set. In her essay Fascinating Fascism, Susan Sontag suggests this lack of pain is far more sinister than it appears. She claims that Riefenstahls minimization of pain can be compared to fascism’s call to follow the state blindly without regard to physical pain or suffering¹⁵; it is an attempt to create perpetual euphoria in the masses. If this is true, then Riefenstahl is actually using the Olympic athlete to send a covert political message.
One of the most important aspects of Olympia is its depiction of the track star Jesse Owens. Riefenstahl would often claim that, if her film were fascist or racist, it would not have given so much attention to Jesse Owens. The film does seem to give credit where credit is due; it is true that Riefenstahl gives Owens a great deal of attention in her film. Furthermore, if Riefenstahl were to truly follow Nazi ideology, she would actually “suppress” the sight of Owens as the concept of a “non-Aryan” race was not even tolerated within the Nazi German discourse¹⁶. Riefenstahl’s depiction includes races of non-European descent. Her later film exploits depict the African Nuba tribes as culturally inferior and primitive, yet free from the chains of modern society, and, thus, fascinating subjects¹⁷. However this, in itself, is paternalist and racist. Mackenzie says of Riefenstahl’s depiction of Owens, “The representation of Owens as a "primitive" is itself racist and colonialist; it is also the same image that Riefenstahl would later make of the Nuba tribespeople... And, of course, such racist ideologies must surely have helped pave the way for the more virulent and violent racist ideology of the National Socialist.”¹⁸ Although Riefenstahls depiction of the athlete was not complicit with Nazi propaganda about non-Aryans, her paternalistic racism constitutes a message about the human body which goes beyond the confines of the athletic realm.
Brundage and Riefenstahl held staunch ideologies which prevented them from seeing even the reality and hypocrisy in their own world-views. In many ways, Jesse Owens disrupts this ideological field. Surprisingly, Owens did not believe in using his position as an athlete to protest racial injustice in the United States. In his review, Jesse Owens: Running in the American Dilemma, Joseph Boskin says, “Though sharply aware, he raised little fuss when confronted with Jim Crow practices and on more than one occasion cooled the tempers of fellow black athletes about to explode in the face of insult.”¹⁹ In fact, before the Olympics, we might conclude Owens held similar beliefs to Brundage about amateurism in athletics. After all, the university amateur system rewarded him well - through preferential treatment to athletes Ohio state actually gave him a high degree of financial security in college. However, after the Olympics, Owens diverged from amateurism. Immediately following the Berlin Games, Brundage wanted to Owens to tour Europe in a track and field exhibition in order promote the Movement and raise money as the IOC was nearly bankrupt. Instead, Owens refused the offer and chose to quit college and pursue the fortune he thought would come with his newly found fame. This angered Brundage, and he revoked Owens’ amateur status, ensuring that his reputation was smeared.
Although Owens committed the worst crime known to the IOC (professionalization), he always retained his nostalgia for the Olympic movement and its ideals. After the Olympics he remained silent on the issue of racism in the United States, rarely using his elevated position to condemn the status quo. Many in the civil rights movement criticized him for this, calling him apathetic - even worse, an “Uncle Tom”. However, the controversy following the Mexico Olympics when Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their fists in defiance during the National Anthem suggests Owens reticence was more ideological than apathetic. Owens’ condemnation of the athletes was based on the fact that the Olympics should promote peacefulness and unity between races and countries. To Owens, the track was not a place for politics or protest; it was a place for competition.
In many ways, Owens’ refusal to participate in Brundages private financial and political schemes, yet his affinity for Olympic ideals represents a mitigation between the idealism of the Olympics and the reality of politics in this world. Owens played the part of Brundage’s ideal amateur. It may just be coincidence that Owens split with Brundage’s Olympic movement at a time when Brundage was hypocritically using the supposedly amateur movement to fulfill his financial and political goals. Yet, Owens’ decision to leave is an unexpected spurt of individuality. Based on Brundages and Riefenstahls rigid descriptions about the athlete, we might expect him to fall strictly into one of two categories: the professional bound to the sometimes cruel reality of money and politics in this world, or the amateur, one free from all those supposed vices. Owens seems to express a desire for both. He wants the respectability of Games a venue for apolitical competition to remain. Yet he also sees the value of sports in relaying a political and economic message.
As we have seen, Brundage and Riefenstahl also see the value of sports in these things when working toward their own personal interests. This occurs because ideologies are generally too “rigid” to fit into reality(Liverani 299). However, in relation to others, they can hold up just fine. After all this is one of the major purposes of an ideology: “ Ideology has the effect of explaining why men are different...how and why certain groups most devote themselves to certain activities and not to others.”(Liverani 298) Owens refuses to define himself by the rigidity of Reifenstahl and Brundage’s ideologies. In fact, many years after the Olympics he published a book entitled I have Changed. In it, he expressed his acceptance of the current blending of politics and sports within the Black American athletic community. Yet he never fully converted to this movement. In his review Jesse Owens Running in the American Dilemma, Joseph Boskin says, “Despite his grudging acknowledgement of the younger generation of athletes, then, he remained steadfast to his past. ‘What had worked for him,’ Baker observes, ‘was a patient personality, a conservative ideology, and an unswerving patriotism.’”²⁰ It truly seems Owens was incapable of accepting any ideology or movement.
Brundage’s and Riefenstahl’s never gave up their ideological view of the athlete. After the Olympics, Brundage would go on to become president of the International Olympic Committee and monopolize Olympic policy until his resignation in 1972. After the horrific Munich killings of the Israeli national team by terrorists, Brundage refused to cancel the Games. He would not allow the very real political horrors of this world to violate the sanctity of his Olympics. Likewise, Leni Riefenstahl continued to portray the human body with this standard of “eros” in mind, and she also continued with her paternalistic portrayal of non-European races as evidenced by her derogatory photography of the Nuba Tribespeople. Brundage and Riefensthal’s views may be intrinsically noble. Their mistake is constructing stringent ideologies out of these views which give an “inverted” image of reality (Liverani 89). Whether consciously or not, Owens broke with this ideology. He believed the principles publicly expressed by Brundage and Riefenstahl were admirable. However, he must have also seen the hypocrisy in there stubborn adherence to these ideologies.
The 1978 World Cup in Argentina
David Copenhaguen
“El Mundial también es confraternidad…y usted juega de argentino” - Official campaign slogan of the 1978 FIFA World Cup
The FIFA World Cup is the most celebrated sporting event on earth. It is a demonstration of global unity and peaceful competition amongst nations from every continent because the love of sport and of soccer is one of the few things that everyone can agree on. However, the World Cup is also a playing ground for more than just the 22 athletes competing on the field. Government leaders around the world and at different time periods in history have capitalized on the World Cup to support their own political agendas. For the 1978 World Cup in Argentina, Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla and the Argentine Armed Forces strategized to show the world that the allegations of murder, torture, and other human rights violations were false. This authoritative and repressive regime staged the event, down to even bribing opposing teams, in order to fool the world into believing that their was peace in Argentina.
In 1978, two years after the military coup d’état led by General Jorge Rafael Videla, Argentina was still considered a safe place to host the FIFA World Cup by most people, despite allegations that the new government was involved in a “dirty war” to silence opposing voices. Although the decision to have Argentina as the host was made many years before the coup, the new militant, and extremely repressive government of the country, saw the event as an opportunity to unify public opinion and continue to silence, and even “disappear” those who were brave enough to stand up to said government’s violation of human rights.
Violence was occurring not only against political dissidents, but even within the military as well. One year prior to the beginning of the World Cup the Armed Forces and other branches of the military were fighting over control of the EAM, el Ente Autárquico Mundial 78. Videla had named General Omar Actis president of the EAM because he was a economically-minded and a conservative spender. Admiral Carlos Alberto Lacoste was extremely opposed and had his own, much more grandiose, plans for the event. On August 19th, 1976, Actis was assesinated by a machine gun while he drove his car. The crime was attributed to the “radical” political party, “Ejército Revolucionario Montoneros” which opposed the military regime. General Antonio Merlo, who was ranked well under Lacoste, took control after Actis’ murder. Everyone who remained on the EAM and the leaders of the AFA (Asociación de Fútbol Argentino) was a subordinate to Lacoste. In other words, any final decisions about the World Cup were in Lacoste’s hands.
With the success of the assassination and the control of the event now in the hands of the mastermind Carlos Lacoste, the campaign to clean up Argentina’s image and wash the blood off of the military’s hands, was starting to take shape. But by 1977, the military started to feel pressure from North American and European nations regarding the human rights violations that had been taking place since 1976. Brigadier Orlando R. Agosti warned, “Nos estamos quedando solos en una zona del mundo considerada negociable por los que creÃamos aliados naturales.” (Novaro y Palermo, 160) Clearly, the political leaders of Argentina were now worried about the image that people around the world had of Argentina’s government and how it would effect the World Cup. There concern was not for the well-being of its citizens however, it was focused on maintaining and furthering their control of the country. The World Cup would be a decisive test for the military. It could severly damage the governments plans, just as easily as it could motivate them to continue forward.
As of October of 1977 the denunciations of human rights violations from the exterior started to become more frequent. The boycott of the World Cup began to organize itself in France, the single most out-spoken nation against the Argentine military. In the French Newspaper Le Monde an article appeared by Polish painter Marek Halter that would initiate the boycott and call for an end to the human rights violations in Argentina. In Paris of that same year, the Committee for the Boycott of the Argentina World Cup, known as COBA, was created. It was supported by groups such as Amnesty International and by the Committee for the Support of the Argentine people. French journalist Alain Fontain of Le Monde, wrote an article in October of 1977, called “The World Cup has Lead Under its Wings” in which the disorganization of the event and repressive government were criticized. Pamphlets were distributed with drawings reflecting the repression of the government. One such drawing had barbed wire fences covering the World Cup trophy with the heading that said: “Pas de football dans les camps de concentration”. Others showed the trophy lined on its inside with skeletons. (Sebreli, 192)
The reaction to allegations of repression and human rights violations is noteworthy as well. General Viola, the man who would succeed Videla, said of the “anti-argentina” campaign of Le Monde, “Esta campaña de denigración realmente nos afecta”. The Argentine ambassador to France, Tomás Manuel de Anchorena, called Paris the capital of defamatory in Eurpoe. Obviously, the pressure of the industrialized nation of France was beginning to affect the way the World Cup was going to be carried out. If Argentina was to host the cup, it would somehow have to appear as a unified and most importantly, peaceful nation. This would indeed be a difficult task, as color television would essentially turn the country into a looking glass for the rest of the world to lay its eyes upon.
To further increase the pressure that France had begun, other European nations started to speak out against the Argentine military and the World Cup. In Holland, the boycott had some of its most controversial representatives. As a soccer-adoring nation, the idea of a boycott frightened the Dutch. In the 1974 World Cup in Germany they had placed second against the extremely powerful German team led by the legendary Franz Beckenbauer. By 1978, the Dutch team was even more powerful and ready to bring home the cup. However, in an incredible display of humanity and personal responsibility (maybe even fear for their own safety), the captain of the Dutch national team (also president of the Dutch Professional Athletes Association), Wim van Hannegan and legendary forward/playmaker Johan Cruÿff both decided to boycott the ’78 World Cup. The boycott also had representatives from Germany (famous player/coach Franz Beckenbauer), Switzerland, and Spain.
On January 2nd, 1978 in an article by Phillipe Collonges, Amensty International published in the 24th edition of their journal: “El deporte no está seperado de la polÃtica: los estadios de la Argentina darán la apariencia de terrernos si no neutros al menos limpios, respetables, civilizados, protegidos (todos los medios serán puestos en acción para esos efectos). La verdadera escena de la Argentina, la de las cárceles, la tortura, la represión de opositores politicos, se encontrará asà minuciosamente enmascarada, rechazada (…) Somos, en ese sentido, los quebramos la ilusión, los granos de arena que frenamos la publicidad de esos paraÃsos exóticos en los cuales se oculta el horror de la realidad brutal”. (Sebreli, 192) It is evident from this passage that the people and Human rights organizations were more than just concerned with the situation of violence that was occurring in Argentina; they knew exactly what would happen. They knew that the government would use all of its resources to prove the nay-sayers wrong. They knew that they would spend more money than they could afford (And they did, US$520 million).They also predicted the extreme measures that the military would take to keep foreign journalists out of the country as well as a massive propaganda campaign that I will analyze later in this essay. Censorship in all types of media (newspapers, television, radio) and brute force to silence opposition is all predicted in this Amnesty international excerpt, and it is difficult to believe that it did not have a profound affect on international media around the world. But just as in the 1934 World Cup in Italy and the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, both staged under authoritative, repressive regimes, the European boycott of the 1978 World Cup was, for the most part, a failure.
The unanimity of the Argentine people in support of the “team” is partly to blame however. For Argentineans, soccer is incredibly important in both socially and symbolic senses. Many aspects of the Argentine’s identification are related to soccer. On top of this, the fact that the World Cup would be played in Argentina meant that the team could not lose. Winning would confirm the self-identification of the nation as “soccer-country” and losing would be a humiliation. Under these circumstances authors Marcos Navaro and Vicente Palermo conclude, “Cuanto más central es un deporte, dentro de un universo cultural, tanto más probable es que en una competencia internacional sus efectos de identidad sean capturados por las oposiciones colectivas ideológicas del nacionalismo.” (163)
This unanimity was aided by the massive propaganda campaign of the military. Campaign slogans such as “Los Argentinos somos Derechos y Humanos” contributed to the strong nationalistic identity that military knew the people would embrace. Hanging above the Obelisk monument in downtown Buenos Aires, “El Silencio es Salud” eerily reinforced fear into the people about talking negatively about the regime. Other strategies used by the military included: Censorship in radio, newspapers, and television, curfews, and strict quota on the number of foreign journalists allowed in the country (of course none with opposing ideologies to the military would be allowed in). By the beginning of the tournament, the stage was set for the “performance” of unity by the naive Argentine public.
The “performance” of unity put on by the millions of entertained fans was not the only theatrical performance going on at the time either. The tournament itself became a mockery of the sport that Argentineans worship. As I stated above was a must-win for the Argentine’s, and the military junta would take any measure in order to guarantee this outcome. Days before the tournament would begin Gen. Videla gathered the team together to tell them that they were, “soldados de la patria y tenÃan que defender sus colores”. Even without explicitly saying it, the General instilled in the players a genuine fear for their lives. Under this kind of pressure, it is not hard to figure that the rumors that the Argentine team was taking illegal performance-enhancing drugs was true. As Former player of Argentine club Boca Juniors and legendary coach (1966 World Cup coach of Argentina, 1970’s Boca Juniors coach) Juan Carlos Lorenzo humoursly pointed out: “Todos dicen que Boca se pichicatea (doping), y yo pregunto- ¿Qué hizo el Seleccionado Nacional durante el Mundial 78, mascó chicles?” The lax anti-doping control of the World Cup means that rumors such as these and others were probably true. In another widely commented on story, it was rumored that an Argentine player switched his urine with that of a pregnant woman. (Sebreli, 202)
Within this context it is not difficult to believe that the Armed Forces would even go as far as manipulating the actual scores of games and the way that they would be carried out. The most obvious case of cheating in a game, came in the quarter finals when Argentina faced Perú, in a must-win game. Not only did Argentina have the difficult task of winning under pressure, but they had to win by a minimum difference of at least 4 goals, a nearly impossible feat. In Sebreli’s chapter on the World Cup he writes: “El jugador Rodolfo Manzo, integrante del seleccionado peruano, confesó ante un grupo de gente que algunos jugadores de su equipo habÃan recibido una cantidad de dólares para ir a menos”. To add to the suspicion, the goal keeper, Manzo, was of Argentine descent. Sebreli also states that Videla made a “donation” of four thousand tons of wheat to the Peruvian government on the eve of the game. Bribery and cheating were obviously not too extreme of measures for this military; even though, looking back, it has taken away from the merit of the athletes for whom this event is supposed to be for in the first place.
The cheating on such a large scale in the World Cup I find to be very symbolic of the military regime and the 1978 World Cup as a whole because it was carried out with an obvious disregard for the sport itself. Sports are representative of fairness and equal-opportunity, where anything can happen and nothing is decided before-hand. In effect, the cheating that occurred in the game against Perú changed the outcome of the event so drastically that, to me, it alone de-legitimized the purity of sport and the authenticity of the World Cup. It can be argued that the World Cup was never as pure a demonstration of sport and athleticism as it has been idealized to be. Nor has it ever been truly apolitical. But the strange case of the 1978 World and specifically the game between Argentina and Perú exemplify the complete degradation of the event. In this game the sport of soccer was removed from the pitch. What spectators saw was a “performance”. The cheers in the stands were real but the action taking place on field was staged. The game we know as 11 athletes against 11 athletes became a theatrical debut for 22 unknown actors, directed by the men in military attire sitting high up in the stadium.
Argentina would go on to win the tournament in 1978 but lose 30,000 of its citizens between 1976 and 1983. In the year of the World Cup, the military not only guaranteed by any means that Argentina would win, but it managed to continue murdering and torturing opponents while the world was watching. It is unfair to say that the Argentine people themselves were responsible, but they were fooled by their government and strategically distracted by their own passionate love of fútbol. Looking back, it is obvious that the 1978 World Cup was a stepping stone for the military to gain public approval and maintain power. The patriotism the 1978 World Cup provoked would appear once again in 1982 during the Falkland Islands War. This time Argentina would not win, and the military would lose its strangle-hold on the people by 1983.
Boycott Politics and Propaganda in the 1980 Olympics
Alexander Farrell
In 1980, a showdown took place between the United States and the USSR over the Olympic Games in Moscow. The USSR orchestrated the event to play a central role in their foreign policy, developing a vast and complex propaganda campaign to create the greatest Olympics ever. Events went as planned until the USSR also decided to invade Afghanistan, creating a situation that demanded American retaliation. President Carter responded by announcing a boycott of the Olympics and beginning a push for international support. A competition between the two states took place over the subsequent months leading into the Olympics, one in which both sides used different tactics and strategies in attempts to win support. I will examine the propaganda campaigns of both the US and USSR through historical statements and images from the time Moscow was awarded the Olympics in 1974 through the 1980 Games. In their attempts to gain international support, each country utilized the imagery and ideology surrounding the Olympics in different ways. The political and media strategies surrounding the Moscow Olympics presented international sports in an openly political setting, and the implications of making Olympic politics overt played a major role in the effectiveness of both campaigns.
Moscow was awarded the right to host the 1980 Olympic Games at a 1974 International Olympic Committee (IOC) meeting in Vienna (Hazan 80). Immediately after this decision, the USSR began its propaganda campaign. The Soviets had an already established massive apparatus of international propaganda through the radio and press available in a multitude of languages. Widespread newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts simply had to integrate new programming focusing on the Olympics (88). Yet, in a move that displays how important the Games were to the Soviets, two brand new publications were created: the Olympic Panorama and Olympiade-80 (89). Even though they were created to focus on the Olympics, Hazan notes that “the ‘Olympic’ publications were used for general impregnational propaganda not always related to the Moscow Olympics. They frequently carried information on Soviet life, industrial and cultural achievements, Soviet history, and similar topics” (89). It appears that Soviet authorities intended to do more than simply celebrate the Moscow Olympics. By extending information on Soviet culture and history into magazines specifically created for the Olympics, officials sought to include propaganda that demonstrated the success and strength of the USSR. The Soviets did not inundate the world with information because they felt like celebrating the Olympic movement; a media strategy with specific themes and goals was underway.
A central theme throughout the USSR’s campaign leading up to the Olympic Games was to demonstrate that the event would be the greatest ever. The main method used to relay this idea was to constantly discuss the progress of the preparations. An interesting and perplexing aspect of this theme was its strange obsession to repeating and exaggerating small details. The media went so far as to create stories on obscure information such as “close to 15,000 kiosks and vending machines,” opening for foreign tourists and “540 medical workers are studying foreign languages” (Hazan 107). Many segments were presented as amazing and record breaking, such as coverage of the Olympic village that said it was “the biggest and most comfortable” and information about future attendance with statements like “no country has ever had such a large number of foreign guests” (Hazan 109). All this trivial data was presented repeatedly and uniformly throughout the entire media apparatus. The USSR sought to add weight to the concept of the Moscow Olympics as the greatest games ever, ensuring that the public understood the magnitude of every piece of information. By discussing every aspect of the preparations, authorities sought to ensure that the public thought the Moscow Games would be unprecedented, and perhaps conveniently forget many of their grievances as well. Perhaps these messages were also utilized to allow the international community to feel welcome and well-provided for by the Soviet administration.
The international importance of the Games was frequently stressed by Soviet media and authorities. Deputy Premier and head of the Moscow Organizing Committee, Ignaty Novikov, stated that “[f]or the first time in all their history the Olympic Games will be staged in a socialist state…they are a great international event, arousing the interest of a worldwide public, they are an important means of strengthening contacts between people of different countries and developing mutual understanding and friendship” (Mertin 238). The Moscow Olympic Games was an historic event, one that demanded a successful presentation to defend and celebrate the Soviet Union’s ideology and culture. Tied into this was the opportunity to spread Soviet values and traditions to all the different countries that were to visit the Games. Visitors, Novikov continues, “…will have the opportunity to get acquainted with the achievements and life of the Soviet nation, with their culture and arts, and the historic memories of our mother country for the duration of the Olympic Games” (Mertin 239). By visiting Moscow, tourists and athletes would be presented with the perfect, idealized vision of socialist life. Once they returned home, organizers hoped that their positive experience would create lasting memories that spread throughout their communities as a positive view of socialism.
It is in this role of expressing Soviet culture that Moscow’s other major goal of stressing the role of cooperation and friendship through the Olympics entered. A writer in the Moscow News wrote that “The Soviet people’s desire for friendship and cooperation among nations echoes the spirit of the Olympic rules. We appreciate that the Olympic games help strengthen peace. It is in this that we see their supreme goal” (Hazan 85). The message that the Moscow Olympics represented peace, friendship, cooperation, and détente was, just like the preparations information proclaiming superlative statistics, repeated ad infinitum. The USSR used the Games to extend and enhance claims for peace and international cooperation, a positive face that would associate Soviet politics and socioeconomics with these happy ideals. The themes and propaganda used throughout this preparations phase, while extensively pursued, were hardly controversial. In fact, a multitude of international officials, like IOC President Lord Killanin, echoed these very same themes of peace and superlative preparations, adding external legitimacy to Soviet claims (Hazan 111). This respectable and covert political use of the Olympics to glorify Soviet life could influence the world’s population while hardly causing concern. The Moscow Olympics promised to be a major and successful tool for promoting Soviet foreign policy through proving the superiority and friendliness of socialism. Unfortunately for everyone involved, an unexpected event occurred months before the Games that changed everything.
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 (Hill 125). The invasion drew international protest, as a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion passing by a 104-18 vote with 18 abstentions clearly demonstrates (Senn 176). For the United States, some type of strong response to the invasion was required. Two problems placed this mandate on President Jimmy Carter: the Iran hostage crisis and the 1980 U.S. elections (Ibid). President Carter faced reelection in 1980, and his inability to act during the hostage crisis was continuing to damage his image in the area of foreign policy. A seemingly perfect strategy was developed: target the Moscow Olympics as a protest to the Afghanistan invasion. In early January, Carter demanded that Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan within the month, or the U.S. would demand that the Moscow Games be moved, postponed, or canceled; if all those goals failed, the U.S. would boycott the event (177). After all, Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, believed the Moscow Olympics would be a “major propaganda festival” for Soviet ideology (176). The United States could severely limit the influence of Soviet propaganda while peacefully retaliating and causing some damage to the USSR’s influence and assets. In a tense and potentially violent climate, the Moscow Olympics offered an ideal opportunity to give American foreign policy a peacefully method of attack.
Unfortunately for President Carter, only the United States Olympic Committee could actually make a decision regarding Olympic attendance. Luckily, however, political and popular opinion was, for once, united behind the White a House. Support was bipartisan: the Republican National Committee, the Senate, and House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved motions urging the USOC to push for relocation, postponement, cancellation, or boycott (Hill 128-9). A public opinion poll from the San Francisco Chronicle showed 75% of respondents favoring a boycott (129). Such universal approval is quite rare. In a Newsweek cover image demonstrates the American public’s view of the Moscow Olympics.
The Olympic Rings, symbols that are supposed to represent international unity through sports, act as multiple barrels to a Soviet tank. Rather than supporting peace and cooperation, Americans saw the Moscow Olympics as an extension of a pro-war Soviet regime. Yet despite the extremely suggestive imagery, the question was still posed and demanded a response from the USOC: should we boycott the Olympics?
Universal approval for answering that question in the affirmative was extremely important. In American politics, overwhelming bipartisan approval translates into a mandate for action. The USOC faced immense pressure at almost every level and political outlet to follow orders from the White House, with only the influence of the IOC pushing against the political winds. When the February 20th deadline Carter decided to set for Soviet withdrawal passed, Carter announced that his decision to push for a boycott the Games was firm and irreversible (Hill 132). The USOC set a meeting in early April to make a final decision on the boycott, while in the meantime all the USOC members were lobbied by chief White House figures like the Secretary of State and Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ibid). The final nail in the coffin hit when information was released about the White House discussing an idea with Congressional leaders to revoke USOC authority to field an Olympic team, or utilizing emergency economic powers to prevent athlete attendance (Ibid). Popular support gave the government the ability to directly and overtly coerce an independent agency’s decision. The USOC at this point had no choice but to give in to political demands and at the April meeting the boycott passed in a 1,604 to 797 vote (Ibid). President Carter succeeded in his initial goal of creating a boycott through political force and exerting overwhelming influence. The extension of the boycott, however, would prove to be much more difficult.
In his international campaign, President Carter initially sought for an IOC decision to move, postpone, or cancel the Moscow Games. Lord Killanin and many members of the IOC, however, strongly disapproved of the way the White House was attempting to exploit the Olympic Games and abusing their relationship with the USOC (Senn 177). Carter nonetheless attempted to persuade the IOC, and he sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the opening IOC Session of the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics (Hill 131). Vance argued that a Moscow Games would violate “fundamental Olympic principles,” that “[t]o hold the Olympics in any nation that is warring on another is to lend the Olympic mantle to that nation’s actions,” and that Soviet officials were already using the Moscow Olympics as international recognition of the “correctness” of Soviet foreign policy (Senn 177-8). The IOC was not convinced; in fact its members were insulted that the American government was attempting to force their action. They responded with a reaffirmation of the Moscow Olympics, arguing that the city of Moscow was awarded the Games, not the Soviet government (178). The exact strategy of overt political coercion that easily succeeded with the USOC now backfired against the IOC. No direct pressure could be applied to the IOC, so demands simply fell upon deaf ears. With the route of changing the Olympics now closed, all the White House could do was lobby for international support of a boycott.
Support of the National Olympic Committees in other countries proved to be just as difficult to obtain. President Carter reflected that “we had a struggle all the way; the outcome was always in doubt. Most Olympic committees were wholly independent bodies, whose members deeply resented any government involvement in their decisions” (Hill 138). The White House relied on its influence over allied governments to push other countries into the boycott. But if those governments lacked any control over their NOC’s, the efforts were ultimately futile. Most notably and embarrassingly, the U.S. failed in gaining the support of British and French Olympic Committees; they both sent teams to the Games, although the governments succeeded in ensuring they did not compete under their national flags (Senn 184-5). Major successes were achieved; however, as many major world players endorsed the boycott, such as West Germany, Japan, China, and Canada (183). 58 countries ultimately participated in the boycott, nowhere near the goal that the White House set at 80 countries (Ibid). American political persuasion once again failed to overcome international disdain of overt government influence in sports.
Yet throughout the entire international campaign, Carter noted that the boycott was not against the Olympic movement, but based in international law, human rights, and the national security of America and the rest of the free world (Hill 133). Compared to the Soviet preparations campaign, however, these statements proved to be far too openly forced upon the international community. The Soviet preparations campaign did not face any strong opposition because its intent was masked by glorifying and hopeful imagery and information; the American campaign for support of the boycott was seen as a deliberate injection of politics in the realm of sport. Even though the US and USSR used the Olympics to push for their foreign policy objectives, the crucial difference was in how obviously political the campaign appeared. Strangely, when comparing these two different settings, the centralized government of the Soviet Union appeared much less politically involved than the democratic United States.
The Soviet campaign that arose in response to the American boycott campaign complicates this emerging dichotomy. Soviet media began to make increasingly clear political statements attacking American opponents. The initial and most crucial role of the Soviet counteroffensive to the boycott was breaking the link between Afghanistan and the boycott. To achieve this goal, Pravda proclaimed that “Carter’s call for a boycott of the 1980 Olympics did not originate today or even yesterday. He set his sights on this target back in 1978” (Hazan 131). It continues with various events that it proclaims as evidence that America delivered threats of boycott prior to 1980. Soviet officials worried that involving Afghanistan would only harm the government’s reputation in the eyes of its citizens and the world as the war continued and the loss of life increased. Therefore, the media diverted attention by blaming America for maliciously planning the boycott. Beyond claims of preplanning, the Soviet press went so far as to accused Carter of “striving to disrupt détente and undermine peaceful cooperation of the peoples” (145). Now the American boycott, deployed in opposition to war, was being framed as an action against peace! Because Soviet media presented the Moscow Olympics as an event celebrating cooperation, peace, and détente, any opposition to the Games were presented as opposition to these values. An overt and contradictory media strategy assaulted the American politicization of the Olympics while conveniently ignoring Soviet foreign policy.
Perhaps the most overt political assault from the Soviets was the way they downplayed the coalition of countries that supported the boycott. Soviet press stated that “[t]he countries which have decided to boycott the Olympics form quite a strange company. They include the fascist Chile, the dictatorship of Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, South Korea…China, Israel, and Pakistan” (Hazan 138). Hazan explains that “[l]eaders of countries that supported the Olympic boycott, such as Egypt’s Sadat, Israel’s Begin, and others, were also attacked by Moscow as reactionary figures, U.S. servants, and so forth” (146). Outright criticism of countries’ regimes was used to reduce the legitimacy of the boycott and the countries that allied with the United States. At the same time as Soviet media attacked the United States for its abandonment of détente, friendship, and cooperation, it used sharp personal attacks against a large number of international heads of state and their regimes.
Exaggerating this hypocrisy, the USSR claimed that sport should be kept separate from politics, even though Marxism states that politics is involved in everything (Edelman 152). The Soviet Olympic Committee condemned “the usage of sport as a means of political pressure,” as another rhetorical attack on the United States (Hazan 149). But the Soviet Union was using the Moscow Olympics as a tool for its foreign policy from the very beginning, hoping to demonstrate the superiority of a socialist state to the world. Because USSR propaganda was presented through such concealed methods such as exaggerated superlatives about preparations and the virtue of displaying Soviet culture and life to the world, the outright lies being spread in the boycott counter campaign were overlooked while the extreme actions of the boycott were highlighted. Soviet officials could deflect attention and criticism by pointing to a much more objectionable action by the United States. After all, Moscow was simply defending itself from the cruel and unprovoked assault from America. International conversation under this framing was not concerned about the very real issues present in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, instead people worried about the implications of boycott and questioned if the harm to athletes and the Olympic movement was worth it.
An examination of the Moscow Olympics opening ceremony demonstrates how Soviet officials sought to present the Olympic ideals as free from political influence while also interlaying socialist propaganda. Early in the ceremony, marchers dressed as ancient Greeks entered the stadium, some carrying a large model of the Olympic Rings, while others were walking along a chariot (“Moscow Olympics”). Marching under a card section that showed a picture of the Parthenon, the participants evoked the Hellenistic ideals of international interdependence and peace through sports (Edelman 156).
This demonstrates the Olympics at its most apolitical, as a celebration of sports and fostering an international community through the Games. Yet a minute into the march, the giant card image changes from the Parthenon into the Kremlin, the seat of Soviet government (“Moscow Olympics”). This transition seems rather abrupt; the ideal of the Games totally disconnected from political influence suddenly dissolves into a massive picture that embodies the government of the Soviet Union. The visual representation of Soviet life breaks the passive acceptance that the press statements previously allowed. In essence, the image of the Kremlin forms a bridge linking the ideas of Soviet life and the omnipresent role of the Soviet government.
Two other uses of the card section create this effect as well.The image below demonstrates the use of the cards to create an image of Lenin in front of a red Russia, while gymnasts form a large hammer and sickle in the field.
The intended effect is undoubtedly meant to command respect and admiration for the history of the Soviet Union with its contributions to politics and philosophy. Instead, however, it demonstrates once again that celebration of Soviet culture is in reality an overt presentation of communist ideology and imagery. Perhaps the portion that is most suggestive of the intent of the propaganda occurs at the very start of the ceremony. As General Secretary Brezhnev enters and salutes the crowd, the giant card section tellingly displays an image of the world with a hammer and sickle over it (“Moscow Olympics”). Such an image surely represents the desire for the worldwide advancement of socialist regimes. Soviet officials sought to firmly establish the USSR as an effective world power through the Olympics as shown in the opening ceremony. Yet the imagery also had the effect of opposing much of the media propaganda used in the preparations campaign. The Moscow Games was not used for peace and friendship; instead it was being used as a centerpiece of international propaganda advocating the superiority of the socialist state. The overt usage of such strong metaphors, along with the American boycott, hindered Soviet attempts to influence the world.
There is a striking disconnect between the complacency with hidden, unspoken propaganda in the Olympics and international attention when more explicit forces attempt to utilize the Games. President Carter’s actions in pursuing a boycott became almost as internationally controversial as the Soviet act of war in Afghanistan. Soviet efforts in preparation to use the Games to celebrate socialist life and socioeconomic superiority, however, were ignored or even assisted by some prominent members of the international community. Universal condemnation only arose when the Games finally occurred and the blatant imagery in Moscow unveiled the true desires of the Soviet administration. Even when the Soviet media directly insulted and criticized heads of state across the globe, the international community and the IOC turned a blind eye. I believe a major factor in determining resistance to political use of the Olympics lies in the perceived long-term effects an action could have on participation in the Olympic Movement. Lofty, glorifying rhetoric about a host country’s way of life, although it could be a major tool in advancing the interest of that country, hardly hinders the future of world involvement in the Games. Boycott campaigns, however, present a real and mortal danger to the Olympic Games. Defensive retaliation to boycotts would not cause harm at all, as the targets already chose to defect, not to mention IOC officials are by default on the side of the host country in these conflicts. Massive and overt propaganda displays in opening ceremonies carry a risk, although less than that of a boycott, with the potential of a gradual devolving of the Olympics into more and more militaristic demonstration. This evaluation shows that initial outrage in the international Olympic community does not always occur against all political uses of the Olympics; propaganda like Moscow’s preparation and anti-boycott campaigns could easily work without drawing any suspicion.
Although the overt use of politics and imagery in the Olympics had a large impact on the US and USSR, contrasting it with the capabilities of Moscow’s covert campaign offers a more detailed understanding of the relationship between propaganda and the Olympic Games. In the Moscow preparations campaign, Soviet influence and rhetoric extended across the globe without any real protest, an observation that demonstrates the strength of unnoticed propaganda. Overt actions like boycott and nationalistic imagery, however, quickly drew criticism and disdain. The introduction of open political competition only damaged the international image of both parties. While obvious propaganda may be useful when a government seeks to exert influence on an agency under its control or influence its citizens, it only offends and distances the international community. The struggle between the United States and Soviet Union demonstrate the foreign policy importance of the Olympics for its participants; the Games offer a unique opportunity to strongly influence communities around the world. This opportunity, however, is not guaranteed.
Utilization of the Opening Ceremony to Showcase China
Jeannie Nguyen-Cuu
Introduction
As the world tuned in, China used the opportunity to turn the 2008 Olympic Opening Ceremony into a celebration of Chinese renaissance and the harmonization of different countries today. The Opening Ceremony, directed by Chinese moviemaker Zhang Yimou, is rampant with semiotic significance. Fighting against misperceptions and negative qualities, China used this ceremony to highlight the positive contributions and achievements, an image of China the world is not aware of beforehand. Because of its symbolic content, the Opening Ceremony provides some of the clearest examples of China’s identity during the Beijing Olympics. However, through the specificity of the ceremony, this identity is carefully crafted and manipulated, leaving a positive, controversial-free, and ideal image of China, leaving the world with a warm and inspiring Olympic welcome.
Pre-Olympics:Protests
For China, winning the bid to the 2008 Olympics was the end to a very long road. The process of bidding to host the Olympics takes multiple years. China was first the main contender in the 2000 Summer Olympics. They led the votes throughout the majority of the process. Leading in the number of votes, they almost succeeded. Unfortunately, in the fourth and last round of votes they had lost to Sydney by two votes – 43 to 45 (Riding). The reasons why they narrowly lost the bid was mostly due to the issues with human rights within the country. This specifically hindered their chances to win. Taking this into account, they changed their approach to their Olympic bid. Thus in 2001, for their bid for the 2008 Olympics, Liu Jingmin, Vice President of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee stated that "by allowing Beijing to host the Games you will help the development of human rights”. This issue itself played a huge role in gaining the rights to win the bid to host the Olympics in 2001, with the president of the International Olympic Committee stating explicitly that “[the committee is] convinced that the Olympic Games will improve the human rights record in China", while the executive director of the IOC stating he was "taking the bet" that human rights would improve (“Document – China: Olympic Games and Human Rights”).
This promise to reduce and eliminate human rights abuse, however was just words and no visible improvements were seen taking place. In the Amnesty International 2007 Annual Report for China, this can be seen. The report stated:
“An increased number of lawyers and journalists were harassed, detained, and jailed. Thousands of people who pursued their faith outside officially sanctioned churches were subjected to harassment and many to detention and imprisonment. Tho
usands of people were sentenced to death or executed. Migrants from rural areas were deprived of basic rights. Severe repression of Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region continued, and freedom of expression and religion continued to be severely restricted in Tibet and among Tibetans elsewhere” (“Human Rights in China 2007”).
The win of hosting the Olympics had a negligible effect of China’s human rights record. The statement above shows the world that a lack of religious freedom and free speech still ran rampant throughout the country. China had broken its promise to increase freedom. When these issues came into international spotlight, people around the world were livid. Thus, unofficial protests around the world began, starting with protests of the official Torch Relay.
The Torch Relay is an Olympic tradition. This relay, known as the “Journey of Harmony” was a 130-days relay meant to spread the Olympic spirit before the official start of the Games. The purpose of the relay is to “showcase the people, beautiful sceneries, cultural heritage in countries, regions and cities along the relay route, …enhance mutual understanding and friendship among people of different countries, [and] further expound the rich implication of [the] theme slogan ‘One World One Dream’”(“Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay Planned Route and Torch Design unveiled”).
Many, due to China’s broken promises of improving human rights, did not support this relay as act of harmony. Protests erupted throughout the world, including prominent relay stops – San Francisco, London, Seoul, Paris, and Buenos Aires.
Media coverage of these protests appeared in the news worldwide, up until the official beginning of the Games. This human rights issue marred the Beijing Games from the very beginning, before the competition began.
Such protest around the world casted the 2008 Beijing Olympics in a negative light even before it began. In response the IOC President, Jacques Rogge, condemned the protest and violence and stated in a press conference that the West should not badger China about its problems, that they are slowly evolving stating “you don’t obtain anything in China with a loud voice…otherwise China will close themselves” (“Lay Off China, Olympic Chief Tells West”). He stated that the Games have brought forth the issues in Tibet to the forefront, allowing change to happen quicker than without any Olympic spotlight and influence. The issues were acknowledged worldwide before the start of the Games. However, to combat this, China utilized the Opening Ceremony, their official celebration to the beginning of the Games, to their advantage, diverging the focus to something more positive. Post-ceremony, any mention and acknowledgement of these issues immediately disappeared from worldwide attention, accomplishing the Chinese goal of keeping politics out of the Games, keeping it hidden behind closed doors. A look at how this was accomplished could be seen through thorough scrutiny of the ceremony’s aspects.
Opening Ceremony: Introduction Performance
The press on the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, leading up to the Opening Ceremony, was filled with negative images and ideas, focusing on its human rights record and other negative political aspects. Seeing that the focus on politics was negative and hurting China, the organizers of the Opening Ceremony, controlled by the Party leaders, chose to eliminate any mention of China’s politics, choosing instead to focus on China’s positive aspects and achievements.
This ceremony was full of visually spectacular moments from the very beginning. The introduction was made using two thousand and eight drummers who were perfectly in sync. Visually, their stance, posture, and appearance are professional and serious.
That, coupled with the chanting and sheer magnitude in number, makes the drummers and whole performance intimidating and daunting. The power of the Chinese is palpable through their discipline and energy. This authority however is strongly contradictory to the message of the performance. Their chant represents the message of Confucius, a message of welcome and harmony. Their words would translate to “Friends that come from afar, how happy we are”. Their stoic expressions were visible throughout the performance, and when juxtaposed with the message, they provide the idea that although China is powerful, they are friendly and are welcoming the world. This message is more evident towards the end of their performance, where their ecstatic expressions, smiles, and energy broke through the unison and order, while resonating kindness and happiness throughout the entire stadium. With the cheering of the crowd, the feeling of euphoria was dominant.
The Commentators
For example, the NBC coverage of the ceremony had specifically placed excitement, anticipation, and feelings of euphoria to the opening sequence of the ceremony. Choosing specific words, such as “pulsating” and “erupting”, the commentators overemphasized the emotions that linger in the viewers. Their choice of words is vital to the emotions and thoughts the viewers have. However, the commentators stated that they had prior knowledge of what is to occur during the ceremony beforehand, having the privilege of watching the rehearsals. Thus, most of their comments are pre-planned and scripted. Their enthusiasm and surprise is not necessarily real, helping add to the positive view of China. This is a technique that allows one to form what seem to be his/her own thoughts, but in reality, these thoughts were constructed due to the commentators.
In addition, another commentator, Joshua Ramo, a source for this report, was Bob Costas's co-host during the Opening Ceremony that enhanced the viewers’ experience. He was highly responsible for setting the emotional state of the viewers. For example, as the scroll began to unfold, Ramo commented, "We begin here with something highly symbolic: a blank sheet of paper, expressing the wish of the Chinese for people around the world as they look at this country over the next seventeen days to fill a blank sheet of paper with new images and maybe to replace images that the Chinese themselves are, in many cases, eager to leave behind."
The Show: History and Culture
The Opening ceremony then featured an hour-long history and culture performance piece in which Chinese dancers and actors performed several seminal events from the 5000 years of Chinese history. It began with a LED-screen scroll that opened onto the stadium floor. Bright and blank, it served as a “canvas” for the Chinese events to unfold.
Throughout these historical moments in Chinese history, the traditional Chinese music was played. This added to the feeling of peace and serenity. The glory of the Chinese past was adequately illustrated. The rich Chinese history was portrayed in a positive light, showing its important contributions to society. Rhetorically, this portion of the show depicted China as an essential part of mankind through the numerous inventions and achievements of the Chinese that we would not of have otherwise. Moreover, aesthetics of this portion of the show added a new dimension to the experience. The bold bright colors present through this part of the show is abundant in ancient Chinese culture, thus presenting ancient China in a similar light allows the viewers to experience the show fully, in mind and sight. The rich history is enhanced through these visuals. Furthermore, the shapes in which the performers arrange themselves in revolve around the circle and the square.
Having this be included in the show pushed forth the idea that the Chinese is catching up with the rest of the world in terms of space exploration. Having sent the first Chinese astronaut into space in 2003, this addition to the show spoke volumes to the world, stating that China is not to be overlooked and is in fact a rising world power. Transitioning from the astronauts, a large globe emerged from the ground.
The Controversy
One small controversy of the Opening ceremony arose after the ceremony ended, illustrating that the importance of image and representation is evident in the ceremony. This idea that image is highly critical to China is illustrated through the usage of a little Chinese girl named Lin Miaoke. She was the adorable little girl that the world fell in love with, the one that had the honor of singing the Chinese national anthem while the flag was being presented and raised. From thousands of those that auditioned, she was the lucky winner. Cute and angelic, Lin captured the hearts of many with her melodic voice. However, shortly after the ceremony was over it was discovered that she was not truly the one that was singing and why she was really chosen. Chen Qigang, the ceremony's music director, publicly announce on Beijing’s National Broadcasting station that a “gap-toothed” and “chubby faced” Yang Peiyi had recorded "Ode to the Motherland," while the more photogenic Lin Miaoke lip-synched to it onstage.
Missing Current Chinese Aspects
One of the most obvious gaps in the culture and history section of this ceremony was the complete absence of any reference to its most recent history – the events surrounding Mao Zedong (China’s Chairman) and the events that took place in China from 1949 to 1976, commonly known as the Mao years. Absolutely nothing about the historic founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was highlighted in the Opening Ceremony and its absence was sadly noticeable to some viewers. This lack of inclusion is highly due to the direction in which the ceremony was constructed under, where decisions about the show’s content ultimately rested with Party leadership (Magnier 2008). When the show’s director was asked why the recent history was not included, he replied that “Chinese history is a vast bucket of water, you only have time for a couple of drops”. The Chinese Party leaders may have worried that reference to the Mao-years would stir unease and anxiety among Western audiences, who history shows is fearful and distrustful of Communism and ideas about “Red China”. Though the exact reasons are unclear. Nevertheless, the absence of the Mao-years from the Opening ceremony serves as a clear example of how the Party tailored the expansive Chinese history to project a more positive image of China for the Opening Ceremony.
The Olympians
In fact, they were not even able to watch the ceremony. They were actually placed in the Beijing Indoors National Stadium, essentially across the street from the Bird’s Nest, where the Opening Ceremony was taking place.
Sitting in the stadium, the athletes had effectively nothing to do but what for the Parade of Nations to start. The athlete’s lack of involvement in any aspect, participating or viewing, in the majority of the Opening Ceremony stresses that the production of China’s history and culture is far more significant in the show. Essentially, the 208 Opening Ceremony is not about the athletes, but rather about China, in which they vigilantly utilized as a vehicle to portray the image of China in exactly the way they wished.
Conclusion
After viewing the Opening Ceremony, it was deemed a success in many people’s eyes. People were left with an awe-inspiring experience after witnessing the show, seeing a new perspective of the Chinese nation – a view without any political aspects. Looking back at it, I can conclude that China succeeded in what they went out to do – to introduce the world to the China no one really knew, one free of political issues. They specifically wanted to highlight the positive aspects of China’s history and not the negative and political side. However, diving more into the creation of the show, the involvement of politics is greater than it originally seemed. First of all, the Party leaders were responsible for the meticulous details of the show’s appearance and content, overseeing the entire ceremony. Seeing the tightly controlled aspects of the show, such as the last minute replacement of Lin Miaoke, it is evident that the Party tried too hard to control the content of the show and thus caused controversy and negative spotlight onto China. In addition, the Party members were also responsible for leaving out aspects of Chinese culture and history. No recent history was included – from the Cultural Revolution to the rise of Communism, none of it was present in the show. But the huge gap was blatantly obvious to some viewers, giving more light to the politics than China wished. Moreover, the ceremony’s purpose was clearly seen to be a showcase of China, despite the Olympics being about sports and the athletes. The athletes’ role at the end of the show, as well as their placement during the show proves that they were only important in the latter half of the show, whereas the main purpose was China itself.
My analysis of the Opening Ceremony is only a small sliver of the show, but it proves to be an illustration of the desired national images the Party attempted to project to foreign audiences. Furthermore, my analysis indicates that the show served as an impetus to allow the world to focus on the Games’ emphasis - the Confucian values of harmony and unity, leaving out the nation’s political viewpoints and current issues in the dark. Although they tried too hard to control the show, causing slight controversies, the lack of explicit political aspects enhanced the idea of harmony and unity. These themes can be seen throughout the rest of the Olympic Games and the lack of disputes about China’s politics and policies in international news. It seems as if the Opening Ceremony achieved its goal in showing that China can be a harmonious and welcoming host, despite its underlying political aspects.
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